This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.
Introduction
While the feature of voluntariness of a voluntary movement, which is generally assumed to be initiated by the process of free will, has been usually left to the philosophers, it is now the time for physiology to deal with it. Issues such as the anatomy of the motor system, the physiology of the motor cortical regions, the spinal cord, and the motor units, the kinematics and kinetics of movement, and reflexes have been the day-to-day activities of physiology. There have also been strides in understanding the pathophysiology of movement: ataxia, bradykinesia, tremor, myoclonus, and dyskinesias. However, physiology often skirts around the issue of voluntariness itself.
It is a common perception that humans have free will, that we choose to make our (voluntary) movements. Each person has that perception and grants a similar capacity of voluntariness to other humans. It is likely that other animals also have this capacity, but it is not known when this trait appeared during evolution. There has been no understanding of volition, however, on the physiological level. What does free will mean, and how can it be studied? As C.M. Fisher has said, ''The neurologist with his special knowledge should have an opinion, or at least should be interested' ' (Fisher, 1993) .
Free will is intertwined with the issue of consciousness. There is some understanding about states of consciousness, waking, sleep, coma, and lesions in certain parts of the brain will impair or modify consciousness (Zeman, 2001 (Zeman, , 2005 . It is difficult to find something intelligent to say about consciousness itself, and philosophers agree, calling this the ''hard problem''. Over the centuries, there have been two general views. Dualism is the view that the brain and the mind are separate; that scientists study the brain, q As work of the US government, there is no copyright. The basic argument of this manuscript derives from a lecture at Oberlin College in 1994. I have lectured on this topic often, and written earlier versions as a syllabus for a course at the American Academy of Neurology (a pirated copy of which was posted on the internet) and for a book chapter (Hallett, 2006) . I am pleased to acknowledge helpful comments from Drs. A. Mele, S. Wise, F. Nahab, S. Pirio Richardson, M. O'Donovan, and P. Haggard.
